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We use a human–subjects experiment to investigate how bargaining outcomes are affected by 
changes in bargainers’disagreement payoffs. Subjects bargain against changing opponents, with an 
asymmetric disagreement outcome that varies over plays of the game. Both bargaining parties are 
informed of both disagreement payoffs (and the cake size) prior to bargaining. We find that 
bargaining outcomes do vary with the disagreement outcome, but subjects severely under–react to 
changes in their own disagreement payoff and to changes in the opponent’s disagreement payoff, 
relative to the risk–neutral prediction. This effect is observed in a standard Nash demand game and 
a related unstructured bargaining game, and for two different cake sizes varying by a factor of 
four. We show theoretically that standard models of expected utility maximisation are unable to 
account for this under–responsiveness – even when risk aversion is introduced. We also show that 
other–regarding preferences can explain our main results. 
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 1 Introduction and background
Many negotiationsinvolvea relation–speciﬁcsurplus for theparties involved. In economic settings,such as between
an employer and an employee, or the owner of a car and a potential buyer, this surplus is easy to quantify: if a used
car is worth $5,000 to the current owner and $8,000 to the potential buyer, then a surplus of $3,000 is available to be
dividedby thetwoparties. In othersettings(such as internationalrelations),theavailablegainsfrom negotiationmay
be harder to quantify, but are no less real and stakes may be substantiallyhigher. The fundamental roleof bargaining
in decentralised market settings has long been recognised (Edgeworth, 1881), and the application of bargaining
terminology and analytic methods to issues like trade disputes, peace agreements, treaties and alliances has been
commonplace since Schelling’s (1960) The Strategy of Conﬂict. However, until the 1950s, bilateral bargaining
situations were deemed to lack a clear predicted outcome; the only prediction was that the division of the surplus
would depend on the two parties’ relative bargaining power.
This state of affairs persisted until Nash (1950) proposed a framework able to select a unique outcome – with
certain desirable properties called “axioms” – as the solution of any bargaining situation that satisﬁes a few weak
conditions.1 Soon after, Nash (1953) proposed a non–cooperative game (now known as the Nash Demand Game,
which we will abbreviate as NDG) in which two players simultaneously make demands, and where each player
receives the payoff they demand if the demands are compatible; otherwise some default “disagreement” outcome
is imposed. Both axiomatic and non–cooperative game–theoretic analyses of bargaining situations can serve as
alternative but complementary ways of understanding the outcome of the bargaining process.2
Both oftheseanalytical techniquesprovidetestableimplicationsfor particularbargainingsituations. As a simple
example, consider the situation where players bargain over one unit of utility – speciﬁcally, a set of feasible agree-
ments (a bargainingset) S equal to the convex hull of the points (0, 0), (1, 0) and (0, 1) and a disagreement outcome
of (0, 0). (This means that the players are allowed to agree on any pair of payoffs (x1,x2) ∈ S, and if they fail to
reach agreement, they each receive a payoff of 0.) In this case, all of S is individuallyrational: all payoff pairs in S
yield to each party a payoff not worse than their payoffs under the disagreement outcome. The most prominent ax-
iomatic bargaining solutions,such as the Nash (1950)solutionand the Kalai–Smorodinsky(1975) solution(see also
Raiffa, 1953), make identical predictions in this case: agreement on the (0.5, 0.5) outcome. In addition, (0.5, 0.5)
is the unique symmetric efﬁcient Nash equilibrium in the NDG, as well as the outcome implied by risk–dominance
(Harsanyi and Selten, 1988).
Now supposethat Player 1’s disagreement payoffincreases from 0 to 0.5 and Player 2’s remains unchanged; that
is, the disagreement point moves from (0, 0) to (0.5, 0). Then the new individually rational bargaining set S0 is the
convex hull of (0.5, 0), (1, 0) and (0.5, 0.5) (see Figure 1), and both the Nash solution and the Kalai–Smorodinsky
solution predict (0.75, 0.25) to be the outcome of this new bargaining situation. Moreover, the risk–dominant
outcome and (if the bargaining parties focus only on individually rational outcomes) the symmetric efﬁcient Nash
equilibrium outcome also shift from (0.5, 0.5) in a Nash Demand Game with the ﬁrst bargaining set to (0.75, 0.25)
1Formally, a two–person cooperative (axiomatic) bargaining problem is described by a pair (S,d) where S ⊂ R
2 is the set of feasible
agreementswith a disagreementpoint d = (d1,d2) ∈ S being the allocation that results if no agreement is reached. Nash’s solution requires
only that S is compact and convex, and that it contains some (x1,x2) with x1 > d1 and x2 > d2 (that is, the bargaining problem (S,d) is
not “trivial”).
2As a matter of fact, the Nash Demand Game provides non–cooperative foundations for the Nash solution. Nash (1953) proved that the
unique Nash equilibrium outcome of a “smoothed” NDG in which a pair of incompatible demands may nonetheless be implemented with a
small probability converges to the Nash bargaining solution as that probability approacheszero. See Binmore et al. (1993) for a bargaining
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Figure 1: Bargaining problems and bargaining solutions (S and S0 are sets of individually rational agreements; d
and d0 are disagreement outcomes)
in the second.
Thus, all of the most commonly used techniques for analysing bargaining situationsagree on how players adjust
to changes in their bargaining position (i.e., their disagreement payoff relative to the opponent’s). In the example
above, the increase of 0.5 in Player 1’s disagreement payoff, with no change to Player 2’s disagreement payoff,
led to an increase of 0.25 in Player 1’s payoff from bargaining, and a corresponding decrease of 0.25 in Player 2’s
bargaining payoff. More generally, given any bargaining set with this isosceles right triangular shape (like S or S0
in Figure 1), any unit increase in one of the players’ disagreement payoffs is predicted to lead to an increase in
that player’s ultimate bargaining payoff of exactly one–half of a unit, along with a decrease in the other player’s
ultimate bargaining payoff of exactly half a unit. This implication is intuitively appealing, as it simply quantiﬁes
the presumption that when a player’s bargaining position (relative to the other player) improves, the outcome of
bargaining should become more favourable to her.
Whether this theoretically ubiquitous property holds in real bargaining situations is, of course, an empirical
question. Thegoalofthispaperisto examinewhetherand howbargainingoutcomesactuallyare affected by changes
to players’ disagreement payoffs. We accomplish this by means of a human–subjects experiment, which allows us
precise control over both the disagreement outcome and the total amount being bargained over (which, following
standard bargaining terminology, we refer to as the “size of the cake”). For the sake of robustness, we use two
bargaining games, both of which capture essential features of real–life bargaining. One game is the NDG, described
above. The other game is an unstructured variation of the NDG, which we call the Unstructured Bargaining Game
(UBG). In the UBG, the bargaining set is the same, but instead of making simultaneous demands, players have a
ﬁxed, known amount of time available to negotiate a mutually–agreed division of the cake. Both players can make
proposals, which have to be in the bargaining set, though they need not be individually rational or efﬁcient. Either
player can accept any opponent proposal; the ﬁrst accepted proposal is implemented. If no proposal is accepted
before the time limit, both players receive their disagreement payoffs. Also for the sake of robustness, we vary the
stakes involved, with a small cake size of £5 and a large cake size of £20.
Our experiment is designed with several features in order to allow a thorough investigation of the effects of
disagreement outcomes on bargaining behaviour. First, unlike most previous studies in which bargaining power
was manipulated through only a few discrete values (see Section 3 for details), our experiment has disagreement
2payoffsdrawn randomlyfromnearly continuousdistributionswithroughlytwothousandpossiblevalues. As aresult,
most subjects do not face the same disagreement outcome twice during the experiment. Second, unlike the only
previous study that did vary disagreement outcomes over multiple values (Fischer, G¨ uth and Pull, 2007, discussed
in some detail in Section 3), our experiment has the subject’s own disagreement payoff drawn independently of the
opponent’sdisagreement payoff, allowingus to distinguishbetween the effect of changes to one’s own disagreement
payoff and that of changes to the opponent’s disagreement payoff.
Ourmain ﬁndingis thatwhilesubjectsdo takeintoaccount theirbargainingpositions– inthesensethatincreases
in one’s own disagreement payoff, and decreases in the opponent’s disagreement payoff, translate into higher bar-
gaining outcome payoffs – they are much less sensitive to changes in their bargaining position compared to the
theoretical predictions described above. Speciﬁcally, both the own– and the opponent–disagreement–payoffeffects
are only roughlyabout one–quarter, compared to the theoretically–predictedvalues of one–half. This result is robust
to which bargaining game was played, as well as to changes in the cake size and in the ordering in which subjects
faced the cake sizes. We will show that this result cannot be explained solely by subjects’ aversion to risk. Finally,
we will also show that other–regardingpreferences can account for our result: speciﬁcally,whileFehr and Schmidt’s
(1999) original model of inequity aversion cannot explain the result, a slight modiﬁcation of this model can. As we
discuss in Section 9, however, other explanations for our results may also be possible.
2 The bargaining environment
We describe here the two–player bargaining problem underlying both games used in the experiment; see also Fig-
ure 2. There is a ﬁxed sum of money (a cake) of size £M available to the players. The way bargaining occurs is
determined by the game, but in either case, the set of feasible agreements is the set of non–negative pairs totalling
M or less. Also in both games, if bargaining is unsuccessful, the players receive disagreement payoffs. The dis-
agreement outcome is asymmetric: the favoured player receives df and the unfavoured player receives du, with
df > du > 0 and df + du < M.3 The values of M, df and du (along with which player is the favoured one)
are assumed to be common knowledge. We use the term surplus to mean the portion of the cake remaining after
subtracting the sum of the disagreement payoffs (M −df −du); this quantity, strictly positive from our assumption
df + du < M, represents the gains available from successful bargaining.
2.1 Nash demand game (NDG)
In the Nash demand game (Nash, 1953), bargaining consists of a single pair of simultaneously made demands xf
and xu by the favoured and unfavoured players, respectively. If the demands are compatible (xf + xu ≤ M), then
each player receives the amount demanded (any remainder is left “on the table”). If the demands are incompatible
(xf + xu > M), then both receive their disagreement payoffs.
The NDG is simple enough to be analysed by standard non–cooperative game theory, but the result is not a
unique prediction. Rather, the game typically has a large number of Nash equilibria, including (1) efﬁcient pure–
strategy equilibriawith xf ≥ df, xu ≥ du and xf +xu = M, leading to equilibriumpayoffs (xf,xu); (2) inefﬁcient
pure–strategy equilibria with xf > M − du and xu > M − df and resulting equilibrium payoffs (df,du); and (3)
inefﬁcient mixed–strategy equilibriawith expected payoffs totalling less than M but more than df + du.
3In our exposition, we will use female pronouns to refer to the favoured player, and male pronouns for the unfavoured player. In the





































Figure 2: The bargaining environment
Equilibriumselection criteria such as payoff dominance or efﬁciency can reduce the set of equilibriasomewhat,
eliminating the inefﬁcient equilibria in (2) and (3) above. If an additional symmetry criterion is imposed, with
symmetry deﬁned relative to the individually rational set, then the unique prediction is for the players to split the
surplus evenly: xf = 1
2(M + df − du) and xu = 1
2(M − df + du). This is also the prediction of risk dominance
(Harsanyi and Selten, 1988).
2.2 Unstructured bargaining game (UBG)
In the unstructured bargaining game, players have a ﬁxed, known amount of time available to negotiate a divisionof
M. Either player can make proposals,which take the form (xf,xu) with xf, xu ≥ 0 and xf +xu ≤ M. Other than
the time available, there is no constraint on the number of proposals that can be made, and the cake size remains
the same until the time runs out (in contrast to shrinking–cakesettings such as Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating–offer
bargaining model). Either player can accept any opponent proposal; the ﬁrst accepted proposal is implemented. (In
case both players accept proposals at the same time, each is implemented with probability one–half.) If no proposal
is accepted before the time limit, the disagreement outcome is imposed.
The UBG is far too complex to allow the use of standard non–cooperative game–theoretic methods for its anal-
ysis, without the imposition of additional assumptions.4 Instead, we make use of techniques from cooperative game
theory. These techniques say little about the precise strategies used by the two players; rather, they have implica-
tions about what the outcome of bargaining is. The core predicts that the division of the cake corresponds to an
efﬁcient Nash equilibrium outcome (xf ≥ df, xu ≥ du and xf + xu = M), but makes no sharper prediction.
Axiomatic bargaining solutionconcepts can reﬁne this multiplicityof predicted outcomes to a unique one; however,
they require an assumption about the relationship between monetary payments and payoffs. If the relationship is
proportional (risk neutrality), then the outcome of every well known axiomatic bargaining solution (including the
Nash and Kalai–Smorodinsky solutions)coincides, with xf = 1
2(M + df − du) and xu = 1
2(M − df + du).
4See Simon and Stinchcombe, 1989; Perry and Reny, 1993, 1994; and de Groot Ruiz et al., 2010 for non–cooperative game–theoretic
analysesof unstructured bargaining using additional assumptions.
42.3 Theoretical predictions
The prediction of Nash equilibrium (with the additional assumptions of either efﬁciency and symmetry or risk
dominance) for the NDG, and the predictions of the well–known axiomatic bargaining solutions for the UBG –
discussed in the previous two sections – therefore imply the same outcome. In all cases, the players evenly share the
available surplus (the amount of the cake that would be left over if both players were to be paid their disagreement
payoffs). There is thus a sharp theoretical prediction concerning the relationship between the disagreement payoffs



















That is, an increase of £1.00 in a player’s own disagreement payoff results in a £0.50 increase in that player’s
payoff resultingfrom bargaining,whilean increase of £1.00 in the opponent’sdisagreement payoffresults in a £0.50














































While the NDG has the desirable feature of simplicity, one might criticise it as an excessive simpliﬁcation of real–
life bargaining. However, theorists have tended to defend it from this charge. Binmore (2007) points out that
when bargainers can commit to demands, but neither has the ability to commit before the other, the NDG is the
limiting case where both bargainers “rush to get a take–it–or–leave–it demand on the table ﬁrst” (p. 496), resulting
in simultaneous irrevocable demands.6 Moreover, Skyrms (1996) argues that in modelling the bargaining process,
“[o]ne might imagine some initial haggling...but in the end each of us has a bottom line” (p. 4); focussing on these
bottomlinesresultsin theNDG.OuruseoftheUBG, by contrast,admitsthepossibilitythatnot all importantaspects
of bargaining are captured by these ﬁnal demands.
The literature on bargaining experiments is immense, and a review, even limiting consideration to those using
games like the NDG and UBG, is far beyond the scope of this paper. (Surveys of bargaining experiments can be
found in Roth, 1995 and Camerer, 2003, pp. 151–198.) Rather, we discuss the most closely related experiments
to ours. Hoffman and Spitzer (1982) examined unstructured bargaining games with (in essence) a ﬁxed, known
cake size and one of two randomly chosen disagreement outcomes.7 Disagreement outcomes tended to be very
5This implication also coincides with that of the “split–the–difference” criterion for bargaining games with outside options (Binmore
et al., 1998). Binmore et al. ﬁnd that split–the–difference does not characterise the data from their outside–option experiment as well
as another criterion, “deal–me–out”, according to which the favoured player receives the maximum of her outside option and 50% of the
cake. Outside options differ from disagreement payoffs in that they have to be forgone in order to bargain (and are thus unavailable in
the event of disagreement), so it is not obvious that the success of deal–me–out in an outside–option experiment has any implication for
a disagreement–payoff experiment such as ours. However, the interested reader may note that as long as both disagreement payoffs are









6The alternative case, when one bargainer can commit earlier than the other, gives rise to the ultimatum game. See Fischer et al. (2006)
for an experiment that nests the ultimatum game and the NDG.
7In their setup, an agreement involved bargainers settling on one of a small number of payment pairs, but side–payments were allowed,
making the bargaining set one with a ﬁxed cake size. Rather than directly implementing disagreement outcomes, Hoffman and Spitzer
assigned one of the bargainers the role of “controller”; in the case of disagreement, the controller unilaterally imposed one of the payment
5asymmetric; for example, in their “Decision 1”, the two possible disagreement outcomes as portions of the cake
were approximately (0.79, 0) and (0, 0.83). Hoffman and Spitzer found a substantial frequency of equal splits of the
cake – irrespective of which disagreement outcome was chosen – even though this means that some bargainers were
accepting payments that were well below their disagreement payoffs. This result may not have much implication
for our experiment, however, as it is likely at least partly explained by Hoffman and Spitzer’s use of face–to–face
bargaining, leading to a lack of subject anonymity.8
More recently, Fischer, G¨ uth and Pull (2007) examine bargaining in the ultimatum game and in a variant of
the NDG. In this variant, players simultaneously submit an ambitious demand xi and a (typically smaller) fallback
demand gi; the players receive their ambitious demands if they total the cake size or less; if not, they each get
their fallback demand if those total the cake size or less. If both pairs of demands total more than the cake size,
each receives a disagreement payoff di.9 Fischer, G¨ uth and Pull were primarily interested in whether behaviour was
similar in the two bargaining games (i.e., whether bargainers failed to exploit the differences in structural bargaining
power that exist between the games), but they also varied the disagreement outcome in both games. Subjects faced
a total of eleven different disagreement payoff pairs: (0, 50), (5, 45), (10, 40), ..., (50, 0). Fischer, G¨ uth and Pull’s
design, with disagreement payoffs perfectly negatively correlated between opposing players, does not allow for a
distinction between the effects on bargaining outcomes due to changes in own disagreement payoffs and those due
to changes in opponent disagreement payoffs, but one can still compute the sum of these effects using their data. On
average, the NDG results they report imply that |∂xi/∂di| + |∂xi/∂dj| ≈ 0.38 and |∂gi/∂di| + |∂gi/∂dj| ≈ 0.41.
That is, subjects’ demands increased as their bargaining position improved, but they were far from fully exploiting
their bargaining power (which, as noted in Section 2.3, would have made these sums equal to one).10
Binmore et al. (1991) considered the effect of varying bargaining power in a different game: an alternating–
offer bargaining game similar to Rubinstein’s (1982) game. They varied how breakdown occurs (randomly or by a
player’schoice), and thedisagreementpayoffofoneoftheplayers; each ofthefourcells oftheirexperimental design
has a different subgame perfect equilibrium prediction. They ﬁnd that subjects in their experiment are responsive
to the changes in bargaining power that result from their treatment manipulations, but less so than theory predicts.
Speciﬁcally, their results (see especially their Figures 2 and 3) suggest that a manipulation implying a one–unit
increase in subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs will actually increase the subject’s payoff by only two–thirds of a
unit.
There have also been studies looking at changes to bargaining power through aspects other than disagreement
payoffs. These studies have tended also to ﬁnd that subjects respond to changes in their bargaining position, but
again, less so than theory predicts.11
pairs. Assuming that controllers would always choose the most favourable payment pair, this was equivalent to randomly choosing one of
two disagreement outcomes.
8Hoffman andSpitzer (1985) report similar results in another experiment, also with face–to–facebargaining. Additional treatments in that
papersuggestthat subjectsbecomemorewilling toexploit afavourablebargainingpositionif instructionsarewritten to speciﬁcallyencourage
subjectsto makeuseof their bargaining power (that is, they are told this is acceptablebehaviour), andstill more willing if favourable position
is perceived to be earned, e.g., by scoring well on a test of cognitive skills. See also G¨ achter and Riedl (2005) for a bargaining experiment
using a general–knowledgequiz to allocate the favoured and unfavoured player roles.
9We alter their notation somewhat, to parallel the notation in the current paper.
10Harrison (1987) also varies disagreement payoffs in an unstructured bargaining game, but with perfect positive correlation between
disagreement payoffs; his “Type 1 game” has a disagreement outcome of (0, 0), while in his “Type 3 game”, both players receive equal
positive payments in case of disagreement.
11As anextremeexample, OchsandRoth(1989) variedthe discountfactorsandthenumberof stagesin a ﬁnitealternating–offer bargaining
setting – so that the ﬁrst mover’s predicted initial offer varied acrosstreatments from 16–60 percent of the cake– and found only a tiny effect
6Our paper contributes to this literature in two ways. First, when previous studies have manipulated subjects’
bargaining power, they have tended to do so through a fairly small number of discrete values (e.g., two in Hoffman
and Spitzer (1982), four in Binmore et al. (1991), eight in Ochs and Roth (1989), twenty–two in Fischer, G¨ uth
and Pull (2007)). By contrast, in our experiment, disagreement payoffs are drawn randomly from distributionswith
nearly continuous support (multiples of £0.01, between 5%–25% of the cake for the unfavoured player and 25%–
45% for the favoured player). This means that most subjects face a different disagreement outcome in each of the
forty rounds they played, and across all subjects, behaviour in response to thousands of disagreement outcomes can
be observed. Second, unlike Fischer, G¨ uth and Pull (2007) – the only other study of disagreement–payoff effects
to use more than a few different disagreement outcomes – we vary the disagreement payoffs of both subjects in a
bargaining pair independently. The advantage of this is that we are able to disentanglethe effect of changes to one’s
own disagreement payoff from that of changes to the opponent’s disagreement payoff.
We stress that the focus of our paper is limited to the effect of disagreement payoffs on bargaining outcomes;
our use of multiple games (NDG and UBG) and cake sizes (£5 and £20) is purely to verify the robustness of the
phenomena we observe. (In this, we follow Roth et al. (1991), who varied stake sizes by a factor of three in some
cells of their four–country experiment, though their primary interest was in the effects of culture and the game
played.) We note, however, that these other manipulations could serve as research topics in their own right, and
indeed both have been addressed in previouswork. Our use of the NDG and UBG games roughly parallels Feltovich
and Swierzbinski’s (2011) “baseline” and “contracts” treatments, the former of which modiﬁed the NDG by giving
one of the players an outside option (which could be chosen in lieu of bargaining), and the latter of which added a
pre–play unstructured bargaining stage to this outside–optiongame. Feltovich and Swierzbinski found substantially
higher agreement frequencies when pre–play unstructured bargaining was possible, and more surprisingly, they
found differences between the treatments in the shares captured by the favoured and unfavoured players conditional
on reaching agreement.12 There is also a fair–sized literature examining the effect of the cake size in bargaining,
usually using ultimatum games, and taken together, they have yielded fairly consistent results. When subjects are
given opportunities to learn through repetition of the game, increasing the cake size raises the likelihood of a given
demand (as a fraction of the cake) being accepted, and sometimes leads to higher demands (Slonim and Roth,
1998; Munier and Zaharia, 2003), though even then, a large increase is needed for the differences to be discernible.
However, in one–shot ultimatum games, no cake–size effect is typically discernible, even for quite large differences
in cake sizes (Cameron, 1999).
4 Experimental design and procedures
All sessions were split into two halves, with a cake size of £5 in one half and £20 in the other half; the order in
which the cake sizes occurred was varied in an effort to control for any order effects. Thus, the ordering of cake
sizes, as well as the game played (NDG or UBG), were varied between–subjects, while the cake size itself, player
type (favoured or unfavoured) and the disagreement outcomes were varied within–subject. Each half of a session
comprised twenty bargaining rounds; the repetition was intended less with a view to modelling the learning process
(though we do allow for the possibilityof learning in theregressions we discussin Section 6.2), and more in order to
on behaviour. Speciﬁcally, their Table 9 implies that even in the ﬁnal round, a unit increase in a subject’s predicted payoff was associated
with only a 0.07–unit increase in the subject’s observed payoff; the value of 0.07 is signiﬁcantly different from zero (p ≈ 0.055), but quite
small nonetheless.
12See also de Groot Ruiz et al. (2010) for a comparison of highly structured and less structured three–player bargaining games.
7givesubjectsan opportunityto improve theirunderstandingof thestrategicenvironmentthrough gainingexperience.
The experimental sessionstook place at the Scottish Experimental Economics Laboratory (SEEL) at the Univer-
sity of Aberdeen. Subjects were primarily undergraduate students from University of Aberdeen, and were recruited
from a database of people expressing interest in participating in economics experiments. No one took part in this
experiment more than once, nor did anyone take part who had participated in any previous bargaining experiments
at SEEL.
At the beginning of a session, subjects were seated in a single room and given written instructions for the ﬁrst
twenty rounds; these instructions described the bargaining environment, the sequence of events within a round of
play, and the way the money payments they would receive were connected to their decisions.13 They were informed
then that the experiment would comprise two halves totalling forty rounds, but details of the second half were not
announced until after the ﬁrst half had ended. The instructionswere also read aloud to the subjects, in an attempt to
make the rules of the game common knowledge. Then, the ﬁrst round of play began. After the twentieth round was
completed, each subject was given a copy of the instructions for rounds 21–40. These instructions were also read
aloud, before round 21 was played.
The experiment was run on networked personal computers, and was programmed using the z–Tree experiment
software package (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were asked not to communicate with other subjects except via the
computer program. Subjects were randomly matched in each round, with each other subject equally likely to be the
opponent in a given round (a one–population matching protocol). Within each pair, roles were assigned randomly,
so a given subject was equally likely to be the favoured or unfavoured player in that round.14 No identifying
information was given about opponents (in an attempt to minimise incentives for reputation building and other
supergame effects). Rather than using potentiallybiasing terms like“opponent”or “partner” for the other player, we
used the neutral though somewhat cumbersome “player matched to you” and similar phrases.
Each round of the game began with a screen telling each subject the cake size and disagreement outcome (both
own and opponent disagreement payoff) for that round. The disagreement payoff for a favoured player was drawn
from a uniform distribution, from 25% to 45% of the cake; for an unfavoured player it was between 5% and 25%
of the cake (in both cases, rounded to the nearest £0.01). These draws were independent across rounds and pairs of
subjects. After viewing their disagreement outcome, subjects in the NDG treatment were prompted to choose their
demands. Demands were required to be whole–number multiples of £0.01, between zero and the cake size inclu-
sive.15 After all subjects had chosen their demands and clicked to continue, they received end–of–round feedback:
own demand, opponent demand, whether agreement was reached (i.e., whether demands totalled at most the cake
size), own payoff and opponent payoff. A subject’s previous results were also collected into a history table at the
top of the computer screen; these could be reviewed at any time. After all subjects clicked a button on the screen to
13Sample instructions are shown in Appendix B. The remaining sets of instructions, as well as the raw data from the experiment, are
available from the corresponding author upon request.
14Thus, with extremely highprobability, a subjectplayssomeroundsasfavouredplayer andothers asunfavouredplayer. Someresearchers
(for example, Binmore, Shaked and Sutton, 1985) have found that giving subjects experience in both bargaining roles can mitigate other–
regarding preferences, though Bolton (1991) found no difference between sessionswith changingroles and those with ﬁxed roles.
15Our restriction of demands and disagreement payoffs to hundredths of a pound, necessitated by the discreteness of money, has at most
minor effects on theoretical predictions. In particular, when the sum of disagreement payoffs is an odd number of pence, there is no longer
a unique prediction according to symmetry, risk dominance and the axiomatic bargaining solutions; instead, there will be two distinct pre-
dictions, differing by one penny, and instead of each player receiving exactly half of the surplus, each receives half of the surplus plus/minus
£0.005. For example, for a cake size of £5 and a disagreement outcome of (£1.00, £1.99), all of these concepts predict agreements of either
(£2.01, £2.99) or (£2.00, £3.00). The discreteness of disagreement payoffs also meant that there was a small chance that both subjects in a
pair would have the same disagreement payoff (25% of the cake), though this never actually happenedin the experiment.
8continue, the session proceeded to the next round.
In the UBG cells, subjects were given a 90–second “negotiation stage” to reach agreement on a division of the
cake. Figure 3 shows a sample screen viewed by subjects during this time. Subjects could make as many or as few
Figure 3: Screen–shot from negotiation stage of UBG treatment
proposals as they wished during the 90 seconds; a proposal consisted of a nonnegative multiple of £0.01 for the
sender and one for the receiver, adding up to the cake size or less. Other than that, there were no constraints on
proposals (e.g., there was no requirement that later proposals had to be more favourable to the receiver than earlier
ones). Proposals could not be withdrawn once made, and no messages were possible apart from the proposals.16
Both the subject’s own proposals and the proposals of the opponent were shown on the subject’s screen (in separate
16Our prohibition of cheap talk, and the restriction of negotiation to computers rather than face–to–face interaction, were intended to
maintain anonymity between bargainers in the experiment. This is important, as removing this anonymity opens up the possibility of side–
payments or threats outside the laboratory, after an experimental session has concluded. However, we acknowledge that lack of anonymity
can be an important feature of some real bargaining situations. We also note that a side consequenceof both of these design choices is they
keepthe level of social distancebetweenthe bargainers relatively high. Some research(e.g., Bohnet andFrey, 1999; Rankin, 2006)has found
that decreasesin social distance are associatedwith a greater prevalenceof other–regarding behaviour.
9places), but it was not possible to view proposals for other pairs of subjects. As long as the negotiation stage hadn’t
ended, a subject could choose to accept any of the opponent’s proposals, at which time that proposal would become
binding. The opponent’s proposals were listed in order of decreasing payoff to the subject, so there was almost
no cognitive effort required to determine the most favourable opponent proposal (it was always at the top of the
list), though of course a subject could accept a less favourable proposal if desired. The negotiation stage ended if a
proposal was accepted, if either subject in a pair chose to end it (by clicking a button on the screen), or after the 90
seconds had expired withoutan accepted proposal;in these lattertwocases, thedisagreement outcome was imposed.
In either game, at the end of the fortieth round, the experimental session ended and subjects were paid, privately
and individually. For each subject, two rounds from each block of twenty were randomly chosen, and the subject
was paid his/her earnings in those rounds. There was no show–up fee. Subjects’ total earnings averaged about £20.
NDG sessions typically lasted about 45 minutes, UBG sessions about 90 minutes.
5 Hypotheses
Our experiment was designed with several hypotheses in mind; these hypotheses will assist us in organising our
analysis and discussion of the experimental results. The ﬁrst four hypotheses concern the effect on payoffs from
bargaining from changes to the disagreement outcome. As mentioned in Section 2.3, a player’s payoff as a share of
the cake size should increase by half of any change to her own disagreement outcome, and should decrease by half
of any change to the opponent’s disagreement outcome. By the same token, both players’ payoffs – as shares of the
surplus available – should be unaffected by changes to either player’s disagreement payoff. We thus have:
Hypothesis 1 In both treatments, for both player types and both cake sizes, a one–unit increase in a player’s own
disagreement payoff as a share of the cake size is associated with a one–half–unitincrease in that player’s payoff as
a share of the cake size.17
Hypothesis 2 In both treatments,for both player types and both cake sizes, a one–unit increase in a player’s oppo-
nent’s disagreement payoff as a share of the cake size is associated with a one–half–unit decrease in that player’s
payoff as a share of the cake size.
Hypothesis 3 In both treatments, for both player types and both cake sizes, a player’s payoff as a share of the
surplus is unaffected by changes to the player’s own disagreement payoff.
Hypothesis 4 In both treatments, for both player types and both cake sizes, a player’s payoff as a share of the
surplus is unaffected by changes to the opponent’s disagreement payoff.
(Note the similarity betwen Hypotheses 1 and 3, and between Hypotheses 2 and 4.)
A ﬁfth hypothesisreﬂects the prediction of axiomatic bargaining solutions,as well as efﬁcient Nash equilibrium
and risk dominance, that agreement occurs with probability one, and is thus not affected by changes to the disagree-
ment outcome – in contrast with some experimental results (e.g., Murnighan et al., 1988) that have found a negative
correlation between disagreement payoffs and agreement frequencies.
Hypothesis 5 In both treatments,for bothplayer types and bothcake sizes, thefrequencyof agreementis unaffected
by changes to either player’s disagreement payoff.
17To save space,we only state the null hypotheses. The correspondingalternative hypothesesshould be clear.
106 Experimental results
The experiment comprised eight sessions – two for each combination of game (NDG or UBG) and cake–size or-
dering (increasing or decreasing) – with a total of 108 subjects (varying from 10–18 in a session). We begin the
analysis of results in Section 6.1 with descriptive aggregate statistics; these will show the effects of some of our
treatment variables (cake size, favoured versus unfavoured player) on bargaining outcomes. Later in the section, we
will disaggregate the data somewhat, in order to examine how bargaining outcomes are affected by changes to the
disagreement payoffs. Then, in Section 6.2 we use regressions to disentangle the effects due to the disagreement
payoffs from effects due to changes in other variables.
Many of the results we examine will involve two statistics,which we deﬁne now in order to avoid confusion. A
demand as a portion of the cake is a demand, normalised onto a scale from 0 to 1 so that a zero demand corresponds
to 0 and a demand of the entire cake corresponds to 1:




We divide by the cake size M in order to facilitate comparison of results with different cake sizes. A demand as a
portion of the surplus is also normalised, but in such a way that a demand equal to the subject’s own disagreement
payoff corresponds to 0, and a demand of the whole cake minus the opponent’s disagreement payoff corresponds to
1. That is,
demand as portion of surplus =
demand − df
M − df − du
for the favoured player and
demand as portion of surplus =
demand − du
M − df − du
for the unfavoured player. (Hence values less than zero or greater than one for this statistic are possible, though
the former is weakly dominated and the latter is not rationalisable.) We will often normalise subjects’ payoffs in a
similar way – as proportions (or sometimes as percents) of the cake and of the surplus.
6.1 Aggregate behaviour
Some aggregate data are presented in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 shows results for the NDG treatment. For both cake
sizes, and both for all rounds and for rounds11–20 (the second half) of each cake size, the table showsthe frequency
of agreement and mean demands by both types of player (favoured and unfavoured), both as a percent of the cake
size and as a percent of the surplus available to the bargainers. Also shown are the mean payoffs to both types
of player conditional on agreement (by deﬁnition, identical to mean demands conditional on agreement), again as
percents of the cake size and of the surplus. Table 2 shows corresponding results for the UBG treatment: agreement
frequencies and mean payoffs for both types of player conditional on agreement.18
One clear result from Tables 1 and 2 is that the favoured player – the bargainer with the larger disagreement
payoff – is able to make some, but only limited, use of her better bargaining position. In the NDG, favoured players
demand on average roughly an extra tenth of the cake (with only slight variation depending on the cake size and
which rounds we consider) compared to unfavoured players. Conditional on agreement in both games, favoured
players’ average shares of the cake are also higher than those of the unfavoured players by about 10% of the cake.
18Notice that favoured and unfavoured players’ payoffs don’t add up to 100% of the cake, even in the UBG conditional on agreement. Out
of 901 agreementsin this treatment, 11 left positive amounts of money “on the table”.
11Table 1: Aggregate statistics – NDG treatment
£5 cake £20 cake
Rounds: All 11–20 All 11–20
Agreement frequency (%) 57.6 58.1 60.7 61.9
favoured player (% of cake) 58.0 58.1 57.0 58.1
Mean demand unfavoured player (% of cake) 47.6 47.9 47.1 47.2
favoured player (% of surplus) 46.4 46.1 44.4 47.6
unfavoured player (% of surplus) 65.3 66.2 63.9 63.5
Mean payoff favoured player (% of cake) 51.3 51.6 50.6 51.6
(conditional unfavoured player (% of cake) 42.1 43.1 41.2 42.2
on agreement) favoured player (% of surplus) 33.3 33.6 32.1 35.0
unfavoured player (% of surplus) 53.3 55.7 51.5 52.7
Table 2: Aggregate statistics – UBG treatment
£5 cake £20 cake
Rounds: All 11–20 All 11–20
Agreement frequency (%) 83.3 85.2 83.5 86.3
Mean payoff favoured player (% of cake) 57.5 58.5 56.9 57.0
(conditional unfavoured player (% of cake) 42.1 41.4 42.8 42.6
on agreement) favoured player (% of surplus) 44.9 47.1 42.4 42.5
unfavoured player (% of surplus) 54.5 52.7 56.8 56.6
Nonparametric statistical tests ﬁnd that these differences in shares between the types are signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon
signed–ranks test, pooled NDG and UBG session–level data, p ≈ 0.004 for both cake sizes).19 However, they are
substantiallysmallerthantheapproximately20%average differenceinthedisagreementpayoffsthemselvesbetween
favoured and unfavoured players (df averages 34.8% and 35.3% in the NDG and UBG, respectively, compared to
15.3% and 15.0% for du).
The comparative lack of exploitation of bargaining position is further highlighted when we examine demands
and payoffs as proportions of the available surplus. Favoured players’ average demands in the NDG correspond to
just under half the available surplus, while unfavoured players demand nearly two–thirds of the available surplus.
Similarly, conditional on agreement, favoured players’ average shares of the surplus are only about one–third in the
NDG – compared to over half for unfavoured players – and the corresponding shares in the UBG are between 42%
and 47% for favoured players and between 52% and 57% for unfavoured players. The differences observed between
favoured and unfavoured players’ shares are also signiﬁcant for both cake sizes (Wilcoxon signed–rankstest, pooled
NDG and UBG session–level data, p ≈ 0.020 for the £5 cake, p ≈ 0.027 for the £20 cake).
19See Siegel and Castellan (1988) for descriptions of the nonparametric statistical tests used in this paper, as well as for tables of critical
values. We note that in implementing these tests, we err on the side of conservatismin two ways. First, we use session–level data rather than
more disaggregateddata, so that we ignore the information that can be gainedby looking at individuals separately. (While individuals within
a session should not be assumed to be independent of each other, neither are they perfectly correlated.) Second, we pool data from the NDG
and UBG treatments; to the extent that these data are different in any important way, this will add a source of variance that will reduce the
apparent signiﬁcanceof our test statistics.
12Figure4 presentssome more disaggregated informationabout therelationshipbetween bargainingoutcomes and
disagreement payoffs. To construct this ﬁgure, we ﬁrst classiﬁed the outcome from each individual pair of subjects
in every round according to (a) whether the difference between favoured and unfavoured players’ disagreement
payoffs (as shares of the cake) fell into the interval [0, 0.05), [0.05, 0.1), ... or [0.35, 0.4], and (b) whether the
difference between favoured and unfavoured players in a particular statistic (demands in NDG; payoffs conditional
on agreement in NDG and UBG) as a share of thecake was in [–1, –0.15], (–0.15, –0.05], (–0.05, +0.05], ... , (+0.35,
+0.45], (+0.45, +0.55] or (+0.55, +1]. Then, for each of those three statistics, we recorded the total number of times
the outcome fell into each of the 72 possible interval pairs (e.g., disagreement payoff difference in [0.05, 0.1) and
difference between demands in (+0.35, +0.45]). Finally, for each of these 72 interval pairs, we plotted a circle whose
radius is proportional to the number of outcomes in that interval pair (so that larger circles correspond to outcomes
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Figure 4: Bargaining outcomes as share of the cake, disaggregated by difference in disagreement payoffs (area of
circle is proportional to number of outcomes)
Note: horizontal line represents equal split of the cake; diagonal solid line represents equal split of the surplus;
diagonal dotted line represents linear least–squares ﬁt to data
segment corresponding to an equal split of the cake and the diagonal segment corresponding to an equal split of the
surplus.20 Additionally, each panel shows (as a dotted line) a least–squares trend line ﬁtted to the data, to illustrate
the association between changes in bargaining position and changes in bargaining outcomes.
Astheﬁgureillustrates,whenneitherplayerhas astronglyadvantageousposition(thedifferencein disagreement
payoffs is low), outcomes with approximately equal shares of the cake are most common, with most deviations in
the direction favouring the player with the higher disagreement payoff. As the favoured player’s position improves
(df − du increases), there is an apparent tendency toward better outcomes for this player (as shown by the trend
lines), but most outcomes continue to be between equal shares of the cake and equal shares of the surplus.
20Thus, circles below the horizontal line segment correspond to outcomes in which the unfavoured player received a larger absolute share
of the cake (for example, if the favoured and unfavoured players capture 40% and 60% of the cake, respectively), while circles above the
diagonal line segment correspondto outcomes with the favoured player capturing more than half of the available surplus (for example, if the
disagreement payoffs are 30% and 10% of the cake, and the favoured and unfavouredplayers capture 80% and 20% respectively).
136.2 Parametric statistical analysis
We next use parametric methodsto disentangletheeffects of thedisagreement outcomefrom otherfactors that might
inﬂuence bargaining outcomes in our two games. Our left–hand–sidevariable is the subject’sdemand – as a fraction
of the cake or as a fraction of the available surplus. For the former, we estimate Tobit models with zero and one as
the endpoints; for the latter, we estimate linear models. In keeping with our hypotheses, our primary explanatory
variables are the subject’s own disagreement payoff and that of the opponent. Additional right–hand–sidevariables
are theplayertype(1=favouredplayer), cakesize(1=£20cake), cakesizeordering(1=increasingfrom£5 to£20)and
round number (1–20 for each cake size). All of the models were estimated using Stata(version 11), and incorporated
individual–subjectrandom effects.
Table 3 presents the results of these regressions: coefﬁcient estimates and standard errors for each variable, and
log likelihoods for each model. The main results are remarkably robust, changing little depending on whether we
consider demands in the NDG or demands conditional on agreement in either game. Consistent with what was
Table 3: Regression results (coefﬁcients and standard errors) – demands as proportions of the cake or of the surplus
Dependent variable: Demand, as fraction of cake Demand, as fraction of surplus
Sample: NDG NDG UBG NDG NDG UBG
(all) (agreements) (agreements) (all) (agreements) (agreements)
constant 0.513∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.017) (0.015) (0.049) (0.035) (0.031)
own disag. payoff 0.235∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ −0.468∗∗∗ −0.528∗∗∗ −0.457∗∗∗
(frac. of cake) (0.044) (0.038) (0.034) (0.090) (0.080) (0.071)
opp. disag. payoff −0.218∗∗∗ −0.217∗∗∗ −0.287∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗
(frac. of cake) (0.044) (0.038) (0.034) (0.090) (0.080) (0.071)
favoured player type 0.011 –0.008 0.031∗∗∗ 0.022 –0.022 0.061∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.027) (0.024) (0.023)
large cake –0.008 –0.006 –0.000 –0.016 –0.013 –0.001
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
incr. cake–size order 0.010 –0.013 0.004 0.022 –0.029 0.008
(0.026) (0.011) (0.009) (0.049) (0.022) (0.018)
round 0.0003 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.001 0.003∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 2160 1278 1802 2160 1278 1802
−ln(L) 1388.683 1389.439 1881.538 78.158 447.730 569.742
* (**,***): Coefﬁcient signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) level.
seen in the descriptive statistics, demands as fractions of the cake size are sensitive to both a player’s own and
the opponent’s disagreement payoff, but less sensitive than they should be according to the theoretical predictions.
Instead of a £1 increase in one’s own disagreement option leading to the predicted £0.50 increase in one’s demand
and payoff, the increase varies only from £0.23–0.32, depending on which statistic we are considering. Similarly, a
£1 increase in the opponent’s own disagreement option should lead to a £0.50 decrease in one’s demand and payoff,
but the actual decrease varies from £0.21–0.29. In all three of these models, differences between the coefﬁcient for
own disagreement payoff and +0.5, and differences between the coefﬁcient for opponent disagreement payoff and
–0.5, are signiﬁcant at the 1% level or better (see Table 4). Moreover, chi–square tests ﬁnd that the sum of these
14Table 4: Additional hypothesistest results from Table 3 regressions
Dependent variable: Demand, as fraction of cake
Treatment: NDG NDG (agreements) UBG (agreements)
βdi = +0.5 p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p < 0.001
βdj = −0.5 p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p < 0.001
|βdi| + |βdj| = 1 p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p < 0.001
|βdi| = |βdj| p ≈ 0.79 p ≈ 0.056 p ≈ 0.88
Notes: βdi = coefﬁcient for own–disagreement–payoffvariable; βdj = co-
efﬁcient for opponent–disagreement–payoffvariable
coefﬁcients’ magnitudes is always signiﬁcantly different from one at the 0.1% level or better. Additionally,we ﬁnd
weak evidence that subjects respond differently to changes in their own disagreement payoff than to changes in the
opponent disagreement payoff, as in one of the three cases (agreements in the NDG), the magnitude of the own–
disagreement–payoffeffect is signiﬁcantlylarger than that of the opponent–disagreement–payoffeffect, thoughonly
at the10%level, and thereis nosigniﬁcantdifferencein theothertwocases. In sum, weare ableto reject Hypotheses
1 and 2.
Thecomparativeinsensitivityof bargainingoutcomes to changes in disagreement payoffs can also beseen on the
right side of Table 3, which concentrates on demands as a fraction of the available surplus. As already noted, both
cooperative and non–cooperative bargaining solution techniques imply that these should be unaffected by changes
to either player’s disagreement payoff; however, the table shows a signiﬁcant negative effect from the player’s own
disagreement payoff, and a signiﬁcant positiveeffect from the opponent’s disagreement payoff. That is, demands as
a fraction of the surplustend to decrease as one’s own disagreement payoff increases, and increase as the opponent’s
disagreement payoff increases. These own–disagreement–payoff and opponent–disagreement–payoff variables are
also jointly signiﬁcant at the the 1% level or better in all three of these models. We can therefore also reject
Hypotheses 3 and 4.
Lastly, we note that our other control variables have – for the most part – little apparent effect on bargaining
outcomes. This includes the favoured–player dummy, which is signiﬁcant only in the UBG, suggesting that the
differences between the types seen in Tables 1 for the NDG can be explained by the sizes of their disagreement
payoffs, rather than by being favoured or unfavoured per se. Also, the cake size seems to have little effect on
demands, though this is not especially surprising in light of the fact that we vary it by a factor of only four.21
Table 5 presents additional regression results, this time with agreement as the dependent variable and using a
probit model with individual–subject random effects. This table shows little in the way of systematic results. In the
NDG data, there is some evidence that players’ disagreement payoffs have an effect on the frequency of agreement,
as either decreasing the favoured player’s disagreement payoff or increasing the unfavoured player’s leads to a
statisticallysigniﬁcant increase in the likelihoodof an agreement. (They are also jointly signiﬁcant at the 5% level.)
On the otherhand, in the UBG data, neitherplayer’s disagreement payoff has a signiﬁcant effect, nor are they jointly
signiﬁcant at conventional levels. We thus ﬁnd mixed support for our Hypothesis 5.
21As discussed in Section 3, the literature suggests that even when a bargaining game is repeated to allow learning, the variation in stake
sizes must be quite large for an effect to be discernible. The studies that have found signiﬁcant effects (Slonim and Roth, 1995; Munier and
Zaharia, 2003) varied payoffs by ratios of at least 25, while Roth et al. (1991) detected no differences when cake sizes varied by a factor of
three.
15Table 5: Probit regression results (coefﬁcients and standard errors)




df (fraction of cake) −1.680∗∗ 0.176
(0.725) (0.871)
du (fraction of cake) 1.316∗ –0.427
(0.708) (0.854)
large cake 0.114 0.036
(0.083) (0.098)






* (**,***): Coefﬁcient signiﬁcantly different from
zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) level.
7 Can risk aversion explain our main result? No.
One criticism that can be levelled at our experimental design, and interpretation of the results, is that bargaining
in our experiment takes place over (expected) money amounts, while bargaining theory involves utilities. Treating
these as equivalent is akin to assuming that bargainers are risk neutral, whereas there is substantial evidence that
people are actually risk averse (see Holt and Laury, 2002, for evidence from a carefully designed experiment).22
Of course, the pure–strategy Nash equilibria of the NDG (in particular the efﬁcient equilibria, which include
our prediction) are robust to assumptions about bargainers’ risk attitudes, as long as utility is increasing in money
for all players. However, it is well known that predictions arising from axiomatic bargaining solutions such as the
Nash solutioncan differ under risk aversion compared to under risk neutrality; as an example, if bargainers differ in
their level of risk aversion, the less risk averse bargainer will receive a larger share of the cake (Kannai, 1977; Roth,
1979).23 Also, the mixed–strategy equilibriaof the NDG change when bargainers’ risk attitudes change.
In this section, we examine the possibility that our main result, the under–sensitivity of bargaining outcomes to
changesto disagreementpayoffs,can beexplainedbyrelaxingtheimplicitassumptionofrisk neutrality: speciﬁcally,
allowingbargainers to be risk averse. We willsee that thisis not thecase; in fact, none ofthe commonly used classes
of risk–averse expected–utility functions is able to explain this pattern of results.
To our knowledge, nearly all modelling of risk aversion uses one of two single–parameter families of expected–
utility functions: those with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and those with constant relative risk aversion
22Some researchers have used the binary lottery mechanism (Roth and Malouf, 1979), in which players bargain over probabilities of
winning a prize rather than monetary amounts, to control for risk aversion among expected utility maximising subjects.
23As much of the literature does (e.g., Roth and Malouf, 1979; Rubinstein et al. 1992), we will abuse terminology somewhat by referring
to “risk aversion” when we actually mean “diminishing marginal utility of money”. Of course, the mathematics of the utility functions we
use – and the results that derive from them – are unaffected by which interpretation of their curvature is used.
16(CRRA). We begin by discussing CARA, which has the advantage (over CRRA and other expected–utility func-
tions) that decision making under uncertainty is unaffected by the individual’scurrent wealth level, which is usually
unobservable to the researcher. The general form for a CARA utility function with risk aversion is u(x) = −e−αx,
where x is the gain from bargaining and α > 0 is a risk–aversion parameter.


















Proof: see Appendix A.
















￿ is also equal to 1.25 Proposition 1 tells us that
even though the sensitivity of the payoff from bargaining to changes in own and opponent disagreement payoffs
need not be +1
2 and −1
2 respectively, as they are in the case of risk neutrality, their magnitudes still must add up to
one. In contrast, the corresponding sums in Table 3 are far less than one (they vary from about 0.45 to about 0.57).
Thus, our results cannot be explained by risk aversion with CARA utility.
We next move to CRRA utility, which is even more widely used by experimental economists to model prefer-
ences of risk–averse subjects, despite the fact that CRRA implies that decisions under uncertainty are affected by




1−α(w + x)1−α with α > 0 and α 6= 1;
ln(w + x) for α = 1;
where w is the individual’sinitial wealth and x is the gain from bargaining.













￿ ￿ ≥ 1.
Proof: see Appendix A.














￿ ≥ 1. Proposition2 yields a
slightly weaker result than Proposition 1, with weak inequality replacing equality. However, the inequality is in the
wrong direction for explaining our result, leading to the same implication as before: CRRA utility does not account
















￿ ≥ 1 seen in the experimental data.26
8 Other–regarding preferences
If risk aversion doesn’t explain our results, what does? One possibility is that subjects have tastes for fairness that
prevent them from making full use of their bargaining power, pushing outcomes toward 50–50 splits of the cake
(as observed behaviour in dictator–game and ultimatum–game experiments seems to suggest; see Camerer, 2003,
pp. 48–59 for a survey). There are now several models of such other–regarding preferences, and a full treatment of
24In this sectionand in the next, weassumethat the utility functionsof the bargainersare commonknowledge,asis typical in this literature
(see, e.g., Kannai, 1977 or Roth, 1979).
25The (binding) constraint xf + xu = M implies
∂xu





























￿ from the chain rule.
26Similar methods to thoseused in the proof of Proposition 2 can be used to prove that when one bargainer has CARA utility and the other
















￿ ≥ 1 continues to hold. In addition, numerical techniques suggest that this property holds for
general continuous and concaveutility functions. However, we have thus far failed to ﬁnd a direct proof of this latter claim.
17all of them is well beyond the scope of this paper. However, we show in this section that our results might be due
to other–regarding preferences, by showing that a minor adaptation of the most widely used model – that of Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) – is sufﬁcient to explain the underreaction of bargaining outcomes to changes in disagreement
payoffs.
We begin by looking at the basic Fehr–Schmidt model. In this model, players have utility functions that depend
on both own and opponent money payments. Speciﬁcally, in a two–playergame, Player i’s utility is given by
Ui(x) = xi − αi · Max|xj − xi,0| − βi · Max|xi − xj,0|, (1)
for i,j ∈ {f,u} with i 6= j, and with 0 ≤ βi < 1 and αi ≥ βi. The ﬁrst term is the money payment itself;
the second term captures dislike for unfavourable inequality, which will be relevant for the unfavoured player in
our setup; and the third term captures aversion to favourable inequality, relevant for the favoured player. Note that
under this functional form, both types of disutility are linear in the magnitude of the inequality, and that standard
own–payoff–maximisingpreferences are obtained when α = β = 0.















￿ is generically either 0 or 1.27
Proof: see Appendix A.
Intuitively,this model of preferences allows for two possibilities. If the players dislikeinequality greatly (αu or
βf is relatively large) or if the disagreement outcome is fairly equitable(df −du is small), then the Nash bargaining
















￿ = 0. Otherwise, the Nash solutiongives the favoured player strictly





























￿ less than one, it does not yield
values like those seen in our experiment. In order to get these, we must alter the model slightly. We do this in
two steps. First, normalise the cake size to unity, so that xf, xu, df and du can be interpreted as shares of the cake
rather than absoluteamounts.28 Second, change the functionalform to make thedisutilityof unfavourableinequality
convex (rather than linear) in the magnitude of the inequality:
Ui(x) = xi − αi · (Max|xj − xi,0|)2 − βi · Max|xi − xj,0|, (2)
for i,j ∈ {f,u} with i 6= j, and with 0 ≤ αi,βi < 1.29
We acknowledge that our modiﬁcation of Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model is ad hoc, and has the slightly
unpleasant feature that it treats favourable and unfavourable inequity asymmetrically (linear disutilityand quadratic
















￿ = 0, as noted in the appendix. Of course, this








￿ is well above zero in all treatments.
28By this, we assume away the possibility of cake–size effects. We are reasonably comfortable in doing so, since we saw no evidence
of cake–size effects in our experimental data. We note that this normalisation is not necessary to explain the disagreement–payoff effects
we observed. We also note that the original Fehr–Schmidt model, due to its linearity, would be unaffected by this kind of normalisation, so
Proposition 3 would continue to hold.
29We are agnostic about the source of the parameters αi and βi. In particular, we are open to the possibility that their values vary not only
across individuals, but also for the same individual across games, and perhaps depending on framing. We do make the implicit assumption
here that these parameter values do not change for a given subject during the experiment, e.g., with experience or as a function of the
realised disagreementpayoffs. Even this might be assuming too much, since Binmore et al. (1991) found that subjects tended to report more
favourable outcomes as being “fair” as their own bargaining position improved. If perceptions of fairness change systematically with the
disagreement outcome, then valuesof αi and βi might do so as well.
18disutility, respectively). However, our point is merely to show that a model of other–regarding preferences can
account for our main results, and for this we use a model that has much of the ﬂavour of Fehr and Schmidt’s basic
model, has the same number of free parameters, and is simple enough to maintain some mathematical tractability.
Obviously, if our simple variation of Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model explains our results satisfactorily,then there
will be other, more complex, models that also do so. (For example, a continuity argument suggests that adding
more free parameters so that both favourable and unfavourable inequity have linear–quadratic forms would yield
anotherutilityfunctionthat couldalso account for ourresults,and wouldhave theadditionaladvantageofsymmetric
treatment of both types of inequality, but at the cost of losing some tractability, as well as being open to accusations
of curve ﬁtting.)
Given utility functions as in Equation 2, the bargaining problem has the form of the one in Figure 5, as long as













Figure 5: Example of bargaining set under variation of Fehr–Schmidt preferences






, and when αf > 0 (resp. αu > 0), the upper (lower) segment of the Pareto frontier will
be bowed away from the origin.

















￿ is generically zero, as before) or a division favourable to the favoured player. In this










(2 − 8α(1 + df) − 4β + 8αβ(3 + df − du))2
− 48α(1 − 2β)[−1 − df + du + β(3 + df − 3du)
+ α(1 + 4df + (df − du)2 − 2β(3 + 2df + d2







2, increasesin the favoured player’s payoff beyond50% of the cake(ceteris paribus) donot increaseher utility, so that the lower
segment in Figure 5 would be positively sloped (vertical in the case of βf =
1
2). Then the Nash bargaining solution would yield an equal
















￿ would alwaysbe 0. Similarly, if βu ≥
1
2, the upper segment in Figure 5 wouldbe positively sloped
(horizontal in the caseof βu =
1
2, though the Nash solution would be unaffected as long as df ≥ du.





























K = (1 − 2β)2 − 4α(1 − 2β)[−1 − df + 3du + β(3 + df − 7du)]
− 4α2[−1 + (−1 − 4β + 8β2)d2
f + 4β(1 − 3du)du
+(3 + 8β2)d2
u − 2df(−2 + β(2 − 8du) + 3du + 8β2du)].
An illustration of how Equation 3 depends on α and β is given by Figure 6. Each panel shows, for one of





























￿ = 0.4, 0.5 and 0.6 (values similar to what we observed in the experiment).
d = (0.4,0.1) d = (0.35,0.15) d = (0.3,0.2)
αu αu αu
βf



























































































































￿ ￿ = 0












￿ ￿ under modiﬁed Fehr–Schmidt preferences (three disagreement outcomes)
















￿ in the range of what we saw in the experiment are easily achievable
using this modiﬁed Fehr–Schmidt model. Moreover, Table 6 shows that the divisions of the cake according to
these parameters are also similar to typical divisions observed in the experiment. This table shows, for the three
Table6: Favoured playershares ofcake: ranges impliedby modiﬁed Fehr–Schmidt preferences, and observed means
from experiment (pooled £5 and £20 cake sizes, all agreements)
Disagreement outcome (share of cake size)


















































￿ = 0.6 (0.500, 0.595) (0.500, 0.563) (0.500, 0.531)
Experimental NDG 0.547 0.505 0.490
data UBG 0.599 0.566 0.536
20disagreement outcomes used in Figure 6, the minimum and maximum value of xf implied by all parameterisations
















￿ equal to 0.4, 0.5 or 0.6 (as in Figure 6). Also
shown are the corresponding mean observed payoffs for the favoured player (conditional on agreement), where the
disagreement outcome was within 2.5 percentage points of the cake size for each player.31
As the table shows, this model has qualiﬁed success in characterising divisions of the cake. In only two of
the six cases shown does the observed average favoured–player payoff fall into all three (or indeed any) of the
corresponding intervals predicted by the model, though in each of the remaining cases, the observed average is
just outside one of the endpoints. More importantly, the model yields qualitative implications like those observed
in the data. Besides passing the consistency check that a higher distribution of favoured–player payoffs (in the
sense that the right endpoint increases while the left endpoint is unchanged) corresponds to an improvement of the
favoured player’s bargaining position, the model also implies that values of α and β that yield higher sensitivity to
















￿) also tend to yield agreements more favourable, in an absolute
sense, to the favoured player(higher xf). This last implicationcan also be observed in thedata, as the UBG had both
higheraverage favoured–playerpayoffs (shownin thetable)and more sensitivityto disagreementpayoffs (evidenced
















￿ implied by Table 3) than the NDG.
9 Discussion and concluding remarks
The standard theoretical techniques used for analysing bargaining situations – both axiomatic solutions and non–
cooperative game–theoretic methods – make sharp, testable predictions for bargaining situations involving a ﬁxed,
known cake and a known disagreement outcome. For each unit one’s own disagreement payoff increases, or alter-
natively for each unit the opponent’sdisagreement payoff decreases, one’s own payoff from bargaining increases by
one–half of a unit.
We conduct a human–subjects experiment to test whether this property actually holds. Subjects play asymmet-
ric bargaining games repeatedly against changing opponents, with disagreement payoffs chosen randomly in each
round, and independently for both subjects within a bargaining pair. In the interest of robustness, we vary the par-
ticular bargaining game played – in the Nash Demand Game (NDG), bargaining consists only of a single pair of
simultaneous demands, while in the Unstructured Bargaining Game (UBG), subjects can freely make proposals and
counter–proposalsover a pre–determined period of time – as well as the stake size (a £5 cake or a £20 cake) and the
order in which these stake sizes were faced. Our design is novel, as there has been very little previous study of the
effects of disagreement payoffs on bargaining outcomes, and (to our knowledge) no study that attempts to disentan-
gle the effects of one’s own disagreement payoff from the effects of the opponent’s disagreement payoff. Even other
studies examining the effects of other ways of changing bargainingpower have limited their considerationto a small
number of discrete changes, in contrast to the almost continuous variation of own– and opponent–disagreement
payoffs we implement.
Our main ﬁnding is that while bargaining outcomes do vary with changes to subjects’bargaining positions– and
in the right direction – the extent to which they vary is substantially less than predicted by the theory. This is true
for both bargaining games (NDG and UBG), for both low and high stakes, and for both orderings of stake sizes.
Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that a one–unitincrease in a subject’s disagreement payoff translates to an increase of only 0.24
units in that subject’s demand in the NDG, while a one–unit increase in the opponent’s disagreement payoff in that
31For example, the means for the column “(0.4, 0.1)” were calculated from the observations where the disagreement outcome gave shares
in (0.375, 0.425) to the favoured player and shares in (0.075, 0.125) to the unfavouredplayer.
21game translates to a decrease of only 0.22 units, in contrast to theoretical predictionsof 0.5 unitsin both cases. If we
focus on outcomes where bargaining was successful, results are broadly similar: a one–unit increase in a subject’s
own disagreement payoff is associated with payoff increases of 0.32 in the NDG and 0.28 in the UBG, while a one–
unit increase in the opponent’sdisagreement payoff is associated with payoff decreases of 0.22 in the NDG and 0.29
in the UBG, again compared to predicted changes of 0.5 in each case. For the most part, subjects underreact equally
to changes in their own and their opponents’ disagreement payoffs, though in the case of agreements in the NDG,
we ﬁnd weak evidence that subjects are more sensitive to their own disagreement payoff than to the opponent’s.
One common criticism of experiments in which subjects bargain over money amounts (such as our experiment,
as well as most other bargaining experiments including those of Hoffman and Spitzer, 1982 and 1985, Binmore
et al., 1991, and Fischer, G¨ uth and Pull, 2007, while Harrison, 1987, used the binary lottery technique only in
the event of agreement) is that axiomatic bargaining solutions and non–cooperative techniques deal with utility
amounts, not money amounts, so that results that may seem to be inconsistent with these solutions (when they are
applied to money amounts) might rather be showing only that utility cannot be identiﬁed with monetary payments
(that is, subjects are not risk–neutral expected–utilitymaximisers). However, we show in Section 7 that if bargainers
are risk averse, with utility functions that satisfy either of the two widely used models of risk–averse preferences
(constant absoluterisk aversion or constant relative risk aversion), the theoretical implication of the Nash bargaining
solutionis almost as strong: while it does not imply that the magnitudes of own–disagreement–payoffeffect and the
opponent–disagreement–payoffare each 0.5, it still implies that their sum is at least 1. Hence, we conclude that our
experimental results cannot be accounted for by subjects’ risk aversion on its own.
Another explanation for seemingly anomalous results in bargaining experiments involves other–regarding pref-
erences; indeed, several such models have been developed at least partly in order to explain such bargaining results
(e.g., Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model of inequity aversion is probably the
most widely used model of other–regardingpreferences. We show that while Fehr and Schmidt’s basic model is also
unable to account for our main result, we also demonstrate that a slight modiﬁcation of their model can account for
this result, and also implies divisionsof the cake comparable to those typically observed in our experiment.
We would like to be very clear about what we can conclude as a result of this last exercise, and what we cannot
conclude. We have illustrated that a model of other–regarding preferences can explain our main experimental result:
the relative unresponsiveness of subjects’ behaviour to changes in their bargaining power. We do not claim that it is
the only model of other–regarding preferences that can explain this result, though because our goal was merely to
show that other–regarding preferences can explain the result, the possibilitythat other such models might also do so
is beside the point. It is also worth mentioning that because the basic Fehr–Schmidt model cannot account for our
result, it’s quite possiblethat we’ve found the simplest model that does do so.
Furthermore, our ﬁnding that the basic Fehr–Schmidt model cannot explain our results should not be seen as
“falsifying” their concept of inequity aversion. Our view of the contribution of their work is that it lies in their
modelling of individuals as disliking both favourable and unfavourable inequity; the speciﬁc functional form they
use (linear in both kinds of inequity) is not an intrinsic requirement of inequity aversion, but rather a simpliﬁcation
intended to keep the model mathematically tractable while allowing explanation of many empirical results. Since
our variation of the basic Fehr–Schmidt model maintains its essential features – only modifying the functional form
slightly – we consider it to be merely an alternative speciﬁcation, not a new model to be compared to the original
one in some sort of “horse race”. (The same is true for more–complicated modiﬁcationswith additionalparameters.)
Along the same lines, at risk of stating the obvious,we would liketo point out that our ﬁnding that risk aversion
does notaccount for ourresultsis notan argument that peopleare not riskaverse. It is easy to show,forexample, that
22a model that combined inequityaversion and risk aversion could also explain the results observed in the experiment.
All that we conclude based on Section 7 is that risk aversion on its own is neither necessary nor sufﬁcient to explain
these results.
Finallyand most importantly,wewish to emphasisethat we makeno claim that otheralternativeexplanationsfor
our results do not exist. There may be other explanations,some complementary to, or at least not mutually exclusive
with, other–regarding preferences (and indeed, each other). For example, it may be that subjects are reluctant to
exploit a favourable bargaining position that they consider to be “unearned”, due to being exogenously assigned.
This might push outcomes toward 50–50 splits directly – through a failure to internalisethe disagreement payments
so that bargaining occurs over the entire cake rather than the the individually rational portion – or indirectly by
strengthening other–regarding preferences (or both).32
Our experiment was not designed to distinguish between other–regarding preferences and other competing ex-
planations, so at best, we might hope to ﬁnd indirect evidence in favour of one of them. On the face of it, the fact
that we found similar results under both low and high stakes might speak against the other–regarding preferences
explanation, since one might assume that subjects should be less willing to express tastes for equity as they become
more costly (that is, as the cake size increases). Such intuition is found not only in some theories of other–regarding
preferences (e.g., Rabin, 1993), but also in some experimental results (Slonim and Roth, 1995; Munier and Zaharia,
2003). However, these supporting experimental results involved quite large changes in stake sizes (payoff ratios
of 25 and 50 in the two aforementioned experiments respectively), so our not observing a difference when stakes
varied only by a factor of four is not conclusive evidence that no stake–size effect exists. Moreover, not all theories
of fairness predict such changes in behaviour as stake sizes increase; for example, Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) basic
model and the variation we use in Section 8 predict no stake–size effect at all (though there are other variations that
do imply an effect).
We would like to encourage other experimental researchers to replicate our results and attempt to distinguish
amongst the alternative explanations described above, and others. Based on our results, we would also like to
encourage theorists, when constructing models involving bargaining, to consider whether the common technique of
ignoring disagreement outcomes, through the normalisation of the bargaining set so that all disagreement payoffs
are zero, is as innocuous as it’s usually assumed to be.
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A Proofs of Propositions 1, 2 and 3
A.1 Proposition 1: CARA utility
Suppose both bargainers are risk averse, with (perhaps different) CARA utility functions. We wish to show that the












￿ ￿ = 1.
In general, the bargaining problem we consider comprises the feasible bargaining set
S = {(uf(xf),uu(xu)) : xf + xu ≤ M},
and thedisagreement outcome d = (uf(df),uu(du)). Theoutcome implied by theNash solutionis the pair(xf,xu)
that maximises the Nash product [uf(xf) − uf(df)][uu(xu) − uu(du)] such that xf + xu ≤ M.




for the favoured and unfavoured players respectively, with α, β > 0.
Substitutingthese utility functions into the general problem gives us:
Maximise [(−e−αxf) − (−e−αdf)][(−e−βxu) − (−e−βdu)]
subject to xf + xu ≤ M.
26Since both bargainers’ utility functions are strictly increasing in money, the cake–size constraint will be binding:
xf + xu = M. The optimisation problem thus has an implicit solution for xf and xu in terms of parameters (along
with xf + xu = M):
(α − β)e−[αxf+βxu] = αe−[αxf+βdu] − βe−[αdf+βxu]. (4)
To ﬁnd the effect on xf and xu of changes to the disagreement payoffs, totally differentiate Equation 4 to yield
(α − β)e−[αxf+βxu] · (β − α)dxf = αe−[αxf+βdu] · (−α · dxf − β · ddu) − βe−[αdf+βxu] · (−α · ddf − β · ddu),
and collecting terms gives us
h
β2e−[αdf+βxu] − (α − β)2e−[αxf+βxu] + α2e−[αxf+βdu]
i
dxf
= αβe−[αdf+βxu]ddf − αβe−[αxf+βdu]ddu. (5)









e−[αdf+βxu] + e−[αxf+βdu]ddf −
e−[αxf+βdu]
e−[αdf+βxu] + e−[αxf+βdu]ddu.
















￿ = 1, proving Proposition 1.
A.2 Proposition 2: CRRA utility
Suppose both bargainers are risk averse, with (perhaps different) CRRA utility functions. We wish to show that the


























(wu + x)1−β with β 6= 1, or uu(x) = ln(wu + x) for β = 1
for the favoured and unfavoured players respectively, with α,β > 0 (a value of 0 implies risk neutrality), and where
wf and wu are their initial (non–negative) wealth levels. The outcome implied by the Nash solution is the pair
(xf,xu) that maximises the Nash product [uf(xf) − uf(df)][uu(xu) − uu(du)] such that xf + xu ≤ M. As with

















￿ ≥ 1 for all versions of CRRA utility requires breaking up the space of (α,β)
pairs into nine subsets, according to whether α and β are greater than, less than or equal to one. Below are three of
the nine possible cases; the others proceed analogously and are left out for space reasons, but can be obtained from
the corresponding author upon request.
Case 1: α,β < 1

















subject to xf + xu ≤ M.
Solving yields the Nash condition
(1 − β)
h
wf + xf − (wf + xf)α(wf + df)1−α
i
= (1 − α)
h
wu + xu − (wu + xu)β(wu + du)1−β
i
.
Totally differentiating the Nash condition yields




























wf+df and yu = wu+xu
wu+du; note that both are greater than or equal to one, since xf ≥ df and xu ≥ du.
Then the above simpliﬁes to
h
2 − α − β − α(1 − β)yα−1
f − β(1 − α)yβ−1
u
i
dxf = (1 − α)(1 − β)
h
yα








(1 − α)(1 − β)yα
f
2 − α − β − α(1 − β)yα−1




(1 − α)(1 − β)yα
f
(1 − α)(1 − βy
β−1







(1 − α)(1 − β)yβ
u
(1 − α)(1 − βy
β−1
u ) + (1 − β)(1 − αyα−1
f )
. (7)
Note that whenever α < 1, both 1−α and 1−αyα−1
f are positive(since yf, yu ≥ 1), and whenever α > 1, both are
negative, and similarly for β. This means that when α and β are both larger or both smaller than 1, the numerators
and denominators of Equations 6 and 7 are positive, and when α and β are on opposite sides of 1, both numerators



























2 − α − β − α(1 − β)yα−1




Let Num and Den be the numerator and denominator of the right–hand–sideexpression above:







and Den = 2 − α − β − α(1 − β)yα−1
f − β(1 − α)yβ−1
u > 0,
























+ α(1 − β)yα−1





= α(1 − α)(1 − β)y
α−1






= β(1 − α)(1 − β)yβ−1
u − β(1 − α)(1 − β)yβ−2
u ,
and it is easy to show that ∂D
∂yf = 0 when yf = 1 and ∂D
∂yu = 0 when yu = 1; that is, (yf,yu) = (1,1) is a stationary
point of D. Also, note that D(α,β,yf = 1,yu = 1) = 0 for any α and β.




= ˆ α(α − 1)yα−2
f − ˆ α(α − 2)yα−3
f
= ˆ αyα−3
f [(α − 1)yf − (α − 2)] > 0





u [(β − 1)yu − (β − 2)] > 0.
Since ∂2D
∂yuyf = ∂2D
∂yfyu = 0, D reaches a global minimum when yf = yu = 1, and as we have shown, D = 0 there.

















Case 2: α < β = 1










[ln(wu + xu) − ln(wu + du)]
subject to xf + xu ≤ M,
and the implicit solution is
h
wf + xf − (wf + xf)α(wf + df)1−α
i
= (wu + xu)[ln(wu + xu) − ln(wu + du)].
Then, following the Case 1 steps up to Equation 8 yields
D = D(α,1,yf,yu) = −2 + (1 − α)yα
f + αyα−1
f + yu − ln(yu).




∂yu = 1− 1
yu,





u are positive, and
∂2D
∂yuyf = ∂2D

















Case 3: α < 1 < β
In this case, the constrained optimisation problem and solution are as in Case 1, and following the steps up to
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f
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(1 − α)(1 − βy
β−1
u ) + (1 − β)(1 − αyα−1
f )
. (10)
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noting that both numerator and denominator are negative. So, deﬁning Num, Den and D as in Case 1, we have






+ α(1 − β)yα−1
f + β(1 − α)yβ−1
u ,

















As in Case 1, D(α,β,yf = 1,yu = 1) = 0 for any α and β, and the ﬁrst derivatives are
∂D
∂yf
= α(1 − α)(1 − β)yα−1





= β(1 − α)(1 − β)yβ−1
u − β(1 − α)(1 − β)yβ−2
u ,








∂yfyu = 0, so that D reaches a global maximum at 0 when yf = yu = 1. This means that

















These three cases, along with the other six (which are proved analogously),complete the proof of Proposition 2.
A.3 Proposition 3: Fehr–Schmidt (1999) preferences
Suppose both players have utility functions as in the Fehr–Schmidt (1999) model:
Ui(x) = xi − αi · Max|xj − xi,0| − βi · Max|xi − xj,0|,
















￿ is generically equal to zero or one.33
We begin by noting that since df ≥ du, we have Uf(d) = df − βf(df − du) = (1 − βf)df + βfdu, and
Uu(d) = du − αu(df − du) = (1 + αu)du − αudf; note that Uf(d) ≥ du ≥ Uu(d). Also, as long as xf ≥ xu, we
will have Uf(x) = (1 − βf)xf + βfxu, and Uu(x) = (1 + αu)xu − αuxf.
These utilities imply that irrespective of αf, αu, βf and βu, adding the same amount to both xf and xu always
makes both players strictly better off (increasing the ﬁrst term of the utility function, leaving the other two terms
unchanged), so the Nash bargaining solution implies xf + xu = M.
Next, we prove a result about (xf,xu).
Lemma 1 If df ≥ du, the Nash bargaining solution implies xf ≥ xu.
Proof: Consider the level curves of the Nash bargaining solution,given by
[Uf(x) − Uf(d)][Uu(x) − Uu(d)] = K.
Each of these curves has a slope of –1 along the ray Uf(x) − Uf(d) = Uu(x) − Uu(d) (or equivalently Uf(x) −
Uu(x) = Uf(d) − Uu(d)), is steeper (slope less than –1) to the left of this ray (i.e., where Uf(x) − Uu(x) <
33Small modiﬁcations to the proof show that the result continues to hold when the αs and βs can be zero.
30Uf(d) − Uu(d)) and is ﬂatter to the right of it. Since Uf(d) ≥ Uu(d), these level curves must therefore have slope
less than –1 when Uu(x) > Uf(x).
Now, supposeby contradictionthat the Nash solutionimplies xf < xu. Then Uf(x) = xf −αf(xu−xf) < xf,
and Uu(x) = xu − βu(xu − xf) = (1 − βu)xu + βuxf > xf, so that Uu(x) > Uf(x). This means that one of the
Nash solutionlevel curves is tangent to the upper segment of the Pareto frontier at (xf,xu) with xf < xu. However,






(where each player gets M/2) and (−αfM,(1 − βu)M) (where the
unfavoured player gets the entire M), so its slope is










(since the fraction in parentheses has a numerator less than or equal than one, and denominator greater than or equal
to one). Since the slope of this segment is greater than –1, it cannot be tangent to any Nash solution level curve at
(xf,xu) with xf < xu, completing the proof of the lemma.
From Lemma 1, we need not be concerned with αf and βu, so we can simplify notation by dropping the sub-
scripts for α and β: α ≡ αu and β ≡ βf.
Then, the Nash bargaining solution solves the constrained optimisation problem
Maximise [(1 − β)(xf − df) + β(xu − du)][(1+ α)(xu − du) − α(xf − df)]
subject to xf + xu ≤ M and xf ≥ xu.
There are two possible solutions,depending on whether the constraint xf ≥ xu is binding (see Figure 7).
xf = Max
￿
1 + 3α − β − 4αβ
2 + 4α − 4β − 8αβ
df +
1 + α − 3β − 4αβ
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(α, β, df, du, M such that
xf ≥ xu is non–binding)
(α, β, df, du, M such that
xf ≥ xu is binding)
Figure 7: Nash bargaining solution outcomes under Fehr–Schmidt preferences, when df ≥ du





























1 + 3α − β − 4αβ
2 + 4α − 4β − 8αβ
+
1 + α − 3β − 4αβ
2 + 4α − 4β − 8αβ
= 1.



















￿ = 0, so their sum is zero as well.
















￿ equal to zero or one. (In the knife–edge case where(1+2α)(1−2β)(df −
















￿, which also is not consistent with our experimental
results.)
32B Sample instructions 
Below is the text of the instructions from our cell with the NDG and increasing cake sizes 
(first part and second part), followed by that from our cell with the UBG and decreasing cake 
sizes. Text in square brackets is added here for the reader’s information, and was not in the 
original. To save space, horizontal lines are used instead of page breaks to indicate where each 
set of instructions begins. The instructions from the other cells are available from the 
corresponding author upon request.  
——————————————————————————————————————— 
Instructions: first part of experiment [NDG, increasing cake sizes] 
You are about to participate in a decision making experiment. Please read these instructions 
carefully, as the amount of money you earn may depend on how well you understand them. If you 
have a question at any time, please feel free to ask the experimenter. We ask that you not talk 
with the other participants during the experiment.  
This experiment consists of two parts, each made up of 20 rounds. These instructions are for the 
first half; you will receive instructions for the second half after this half has ended. Each round in 
this half consists of one play of a simple bargaining game, played between two people via the 
computer. In every round, you are randomly matched to another participant, with whom you will 
play this bargaining game. You will not be told the identity of the person you are matched with in 
any round, nor will they be told your identity – even after the end of the session.  
The bargaining game is as follows. You and the person matched to you bargain over a £5.00 
prize. You and the other person make simultaneous claims for shares of this prize.  
- If your claims add up to the amount of the prize or less, you receive your claim, and the other 
person receives his/her claim.  
- If your claims add up to more than the amount of the prize, you receive an “outside option”, and 
the other person receives a different “outside option”.  
These outside options are chosen randomly by the computer, and vary from round to round and 
from person to person. In each round, you and the person matched to you are informed of both of 
your outside options before choosing your claims. 
 
Sequence of Play: The sequence of play in a round is as follows.  
(1)  The computer randomly matches you to another participant, and randomly determines your 
outside option and the outside option of the other person. Your computer screen will display 
both your outside option and that of the other person.  
(2)  You choose a claim for your share of the £5.00 prize. The other person chooses a claim for 
his/her share of the prize. Your claim can be any multiple of 0.01, between zero and 5.00 
inclusive. Both of you choose your claim before being informed of the other’s. 
(3)  The round ends. You receive the following information: your own choice, the choice made by 
the person matched with you, your own payoff for the round, the payoff of the person 
matched with you.  
After this, you go on to the next round. 
 
Payments: At the end of the experimental session, two rounds from this half will be chosen 
randomly for each participant. You will be paid the total of your earnings in those two rounds. 
In addition, there will be opportunities for payments in the second half of the session. 
Payments are made privately and in cash at the end of the session. 
——————————————————————————————————————— Instructions: second part of experiment [NDG, increasing cake sizes] 
The procedure in this part of the experiment is nearly the same as that in the first part. You will 
play the same bargaining game as before, for 20 additional rounds. The participant matched with 
you will still be chosen randomly in every round, and your outside options will also be chosen 
randomly in every round.  
The difference from the first part of the experiment is that the prize is now worth £20. So, you 
and the other person are now choosing shares of £20 instead of £5. Your claim – and that of the 
other person – can now be any multiple of 0.01, between zero and 20.00 inclusive.  
 
As before, if your claims add up to the amount of the prize or less, you receive your claim, and 
the other person receives his/her claim. If your claims add up to more than the amount of the 
prize, you both receive your respective outside options.  
 
At the end of the experimental session, two rounds from this half will be chosen randomly for 
each participant. You will be paid the total of your earnings in those two rounds. Your 
earnings from this part of the experiment will be added to your earnings from the previous 
part.  
——————————————————————————————————————— 
Instructions: first part of experiment [UBG, decreasing cake sizes] 
You are about to participate in a decision making experiment. Please read these instructions 
carefully, as the amount of money you earn may depend on how well you understand them. If you 
have a question at any time, please feel free to ask the experimenter. We ask that you not talk 
with the other participants during the experiment.  
This experiment consists of two parts, each made up of 20 rounds. These instructions are for the 
first half; you will receive instructions for the second half after this half has ended. Each round in 
this half consists of one play of a simple bargaining game, played between two people via the 
computer. In every round, you are randomly matched to another participant, with whom you will 
play this bargaining game. You will not be told the identity of the person you are matched with in 
any round, nor will they be told your identity – even after the end of the session.  
The bargaining game is as follows. You and the person matched to you bargain over a £20.00 
prize. You do this by sending and receiving proposals for dividing the prize during a “negotiation 
stage” of the game. Below is an example of how the bottom portion of your computer screen will 
look during the negotiation stage. 
  
 
To send a proposal to the other person, type the amounts for yourself and the other person in the 
“Make a proposal” box, then click “Send proposal”. The amounts you enter must be between zero 
and the amount of the prize (inclusive), and can have 0, 1 or 2 decimal places. The two amounts 
together must add up to the amount of the prize, or less. All of your proposals will appear in the 
box in the bottom-centre of your screen, and all of the proposals made by the other person will 
appear in the box in the bottom-right. The person matched to you will see these proposals as well, 
but no one else will be able to see your proposals, nor will you be able to see theirs.  
 
You may accept any one of the proposals from the person matched to you, or none of them. To 
accept a proposal, highlight the one you wish to accept and click “Accept proposal”. If either you 
or the other person accepts a proposal, then you have reached an agreement, and the prize is 
divided according to the accepted proposal. 
 
The negotiation stage lasts for up to 90 seconds; you may send as many or as few proposals as 
you wish during that time. You may end the negotiation stage before the 90 seconds are over, by 
clicking on the button labelled “End this stage” on the right of your screen. Once you or the 
person matched with you has clicked this button, it is not possible to send or accept proposals.  
 
If you or the other person ends the negotiation stage early, or if the time available for proposals 
ends without you reaching an agreement, then you receive an “outside option”, and the other 
person receives a different “outside option”. These outside options are chosen randomly by the 
computer, and vary from round to round and from person to person. In each round, you and the 
person matched to you are informed of both of your outside options at the beginning of the 
negotiation stage. 
 
Sequence of Play: The sequence of play in a round is as follows.  
(1)  The computer randomly matches you to another participant, and randomly determines your 
outside option and the outside option of the other person. Your computer screen will display 
both your outside option and that of the other person.  
(2)  The negotiation stage begins. You can send proposals for dividing the £20.00 prize. The other 
person can also send proposals for dividing the £20.00 prize; you can accept one of these 
proposals or none of them. 
(3)  The round ends. You receive the following information: whether or not you reached an 
agreement, your own payoff, the payoff of the person matched with you.  
After this, you go on to the next round. 
 Payments: At the end of the experimental session, two rounds from this half will be chosen 
randomly for each participant. You will be paid the total of your earnings in those two rounds. 
In addition, there will be opportunities for payments in the second half of the session. 
Payments are made privately and in cash at the end of the session. 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
Instructions: second part of experiment [UBG, decreasing cake sizes] 
The procedure in this part of the experiment is nearly the same as that in the first part. You will 
play the same bargaining game as before, for 20 additional rounds. The participant matched with 
you will still be chosen randomly in every round, and your outside options will also be chosen 
randomly in every round.  
The difference from the first part of the experiment is that the prize is now worth £5. So, you and 
the other person are now sending and receiving proposals for dividing £5 instead of £20. The 
amounts you propose for yourself – and for the other person – can now be any multiple of 0.01, 
between zero and 5.00 inclusive, and they must add up to 5.00 or less.  
 
As before, if you or the other person ends the negotiation stage early, or if the time available for 
proposals ends without reaching agreement, then you both receive your respective outside 
options.  
 
At the end of the experimental session, two rounds from this half will be chosen randomly for 
each participant. You will be paid the total of your earnings in those two rounds. Your 
earnings from this part of the experiment will be added to your earnings from the previous 
part.  
 
 
 